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Abstract
A large number of the most-subscribed YouTube channels tar-
get children of very young age. Hundreds of toddler-oriented
channels on YouTube feature inoffensive, well produced, and
educational videos. Unfortunately, inappropriate content that
targets this demographic is also common. YouTube’s algorith-
mic recommendation system regrettably suggests inappropriate
content because some of it mimics or is derived from otherwise
appropriate content. Considering the risk for early childhood
development, and an increasing trend in toddler’s consumption
of YouTube media, this is a worrisome problem.
In this work, we build a classifier able to discern inappropri-
ate content that targets toddlers on YouTube with 84.3% accu-
racy, and leverage it to perform a first-of-its-kind, large-scale,
quantitative characterization that reveals some of the risks of
YouTube media consumption by young children. Our analysis
reveals that YouTube is still plagued by such disturbing videos
and its currently deployed counter-measures are ineffective in
terms of detecting them in a timely manner. Alarmingly, using
our classifier we show that young children are not only able,
but likely to encounter disturbing videos when they randomly
browse the platform starting from benign videos.
1 Introduction
YouTube has emerged as an alternative to traditional children’s
TV, and a plethora of popular children’s videos can be found on
the platform. For example, consider the millions of subscribers
that the most popular toddler-oriented YouTube channels have:
ChuChu TV is the most-subscribed “child-themed” channel,
with 19.9M subscribers [30] as of September 2018. While most
toddler-oriented content is inoffensive, and is actually enter-
taining or educational, recent reports have highlighted the trend
of inappropriate content targeting this demographic [31, 23].
Borrowing the terminology from the early press articles on
the topic, we refer to this new class of content as disturb-
ing. A prominent example of this trend is the Elsagate contro-
versy [27, 8], where malicious users uploaded videos featuring
popular cartoon characters like Spiderman, Disney’s Frozen,
Mickey Mouse, etc., combined with disturbing content contain-
ing, for example, mild violence and sexual connotations. These
Figure 1: Examples of disturbing videos, i.e. inappropriate videos that
target toddlers.
disturbing videos usually include an innocent thumbnail aim-
ing at tricking the toddlers and their custodians. Figure 1 shows
examples of such videos. The issue at hand is that these videos
have hundreds of thousands of views, more likes than dislikes,
and have been available on the platform since 2016.
In an attempt to offer a safer online experience for its young
audience, YouTube launched the YouTube Kids application1,
which equips parents with several controls enabling them to
decide what their children are allowed to watch on YouTube.
Unfortunately, despite YouTube’s attempts to curb the phe-
nomenon of inappropriate videos for toddlers, disturbing videos
still appear, even in YouTube Kids [35], due to the difficulty of
identifying them. An explanation for this may be that YouTube
relies heavily on users reporting videos they consider disturb-
ing2, and then YouTube employees manually inspecting them.
However, since the process involves manual labor, the whole
mechanism does not easily scale to the amount of videos that a
platform like YouTube serves.
In this paper, we provide the first study of toddler-oriented
disturbing content on YouTube. For the purposes of this work,
we extend the definition of a toddler to any child aged between
1 and 5 years.
Our study comprises three phases. First, we aim to charac-
terize the phenomenon of inappropriate videos geared towards
toddlers. To this end, we collect, manually review, and charac-
terize toddler-oriented videos (both Elsagate-related and other
child-related videos), as well as random and popular videos.
For a more detailed analysis of the problem, we label these
videos as one of four categories: 1) suitable; 2) disturbing;
1https://www.youtube.com/yt/kids/
2https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802027
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3) restricted (equivalent to MPAA’s3 NC-17 and R categories);
and 4) irrelevant videos (see Section Manual Annotation Pro-
cess). Our characterization confirms that unscrupulous and po-
tentially profit-driven uploaders create disturbing videos with
similar characteristics as benign toddler-oriented videos in an
attempt to make them show up as recommendations to toddlers
browsing the platform.
Second, we develop a deep learning classifier to automati-
cally detect disturbing videos. Even though this classifier per-
forms better than baseline models, it still has a lower than
desired performance. In fact, this low performance reflects
the high degree of similarity between disturbing and suitable
videos or restricted videos that do not target toddlers. It also re-
flects the subjectivity in deciding how to label these controver-
sial videos, as confirmed by our trained annotators’ experience.
For the sake of our analysis in the next steps, we collapse the
initially defined labels into two categories and develop a more
accurate classifier that is able to discern inappropriate from ap-
propriate videos. Our experimental evaluation shows that the
developed binary classifier outperforms several baselines with
an accuracy of 84.3%.
In the last phase, we leverage the developed classifier to
understand how prominent the problem at hand is. From our
analysis on different subsets of the collected videos, we find
that 1.1% of the 233,337 Elsagate-related, and 0.5% of the
154,957 other children-related collected videos are inappropri-
ate for toddlers, which indicates that the problem is not negli-
gible. To further assess how safe YouTube is for toddlers, we
run a live simulation in which we mimic a toddler randomly
clicking on YouTube’s suggested videos. We find that there is
a 3.5% chance that a toddler following YouTube’s recommen-
dations will encounter an inappropriate video within ten hops
if she starts from a video that appears among the top ten results
of a toddler-appropriate keyword search (e.g., Peppa Pig).
Last, our assessment on YouTube’s current mitigations
shows that the platform struggles to keep up with the problem:
only 20.5% and 2.5% of our manually reviewed disturbing and
restricted videos, respectively, have been removed by YouTube.
Furthermore, disturbing videos in our ground truth dataset have
been live on YouTube for a mean of 942 days.
Contributions. In summary, our contribution is threefold:
1. We undertake a large-scale analysis of the disturbing videos
problem that is currently plaguing YouTube.
2. We propose a reasonably accurate classifier that can be used
to discern disturbing videos which target toddlers.
3. We make publicly available the implementation of the classi-
fier, the manually reviewed ground truth dataset that consists
of 4,797 videos, and the metadata of all the collected and ex-
amined videos so that the research community can build on
our results to further investigate the problem.
3MPAA stands for Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) https://
www.mpaa.org/film-ratings/
Seed Keywords Type Example
Elsagate-related “spiderman kiss elsa”, “frozen elsa spiderman pranks”
“minnie mickey pregnancy”, “halloween finger family”
Other Child-related “pink panther classic cartoon”, “felix the cat cartoon”,
“tom and jerry episode”, “learn colors for kids”
Table 1: Examples of the Elsagate-related and other child-related seed
keywords used in our data collection.
2 Methodology
In this section, we present our data collection process and the
methodology followed for building our ground truth.
2.1 Data Collection
For our data collection, we use the YouTube Data API4,
which provides metadata of videos uploaded on YouTube. Un-
fortunately, YouTube does not provide an API for retrieving
videos from YouTube Kids. We collect a set of seed videos us-
ing four different approaches. First, we use information from
/r/ElsaGate, a subreddit dedicated to raising awareness about
disturbing videos problem [27]. Second, we use information
from /r/fullcartoonsonyoutube5, a subreddit dedicated to listing
cartoon videos available on YouTube. The other two approaches
focus on obtaining a set of random and popular videos.
Specifically: 1) we create a list of 64 keywords6 by extract-
ing n-grams from the title of videos posted on /r/ElsaGate.
Subsequently, for each keyword, we obtain the first 30 videos
as returned by YouTube’s Data API search functionality. This
approach resulted in the acquisition of 893 seed videos. Ad-
ditionally, we create a list of 33 channels7, which are men-
tioned by users on /r/ElsaGate because of publishing disturb-
ing videos [8, 27]. Then, for each channel we collect all their
videos, hence acquiring a set of 181 additional seed videos; 2)
we create a list of 83 keywords8 by extracting n-grams from
the title of videos posted on /r/fullcartoonsonyoutube. Similar
to the previous approach, for each keyword, we obtain the first
30 videos as returned by the YouTube’s Data API search func-
tionality, hence acquiring another 2,342 seed videos; 3) to ob-
tain a random sample of videos, we use the Random YouTube
API9, which provides random YouTube video identifiers which
we then download using the YouTube Data API. This approach
resulted in the acquisition of 8,391 seed random videos; and 4)
we also collect the most popular videos in the USA, the UK,
Russia, India, and Canada, between November 18 and Novem-
ber 21, 2018, hence acquiring another 500 seed videos. Table 1
shows some examples of the Elsagate-related and other child-
related keywords used.
Using these approaches, we collect 12,097 unique seed
videos. However, this dataset is not big enough to study the id-
iosyncrasies of this problem. Therefore, to expand our dataset,
for each seed video we iteratively collect the top 10 recom-
4https://developers.google.com/youtube/v3/
5https://www.reddit.com/r/fullcartoonsonyoutube/
6https://tinyurl.com/yxpf73j4
7https://tinyurl.com/y5zhy4vt
8https://tinyurl.com/y23xxl3c
9https://randomyoutube.net/api
2
Crawling Strategy # Seed # Recommended
Elsagate-related 1,074 232,263
Other Child-related Keywords 2,342 152,615
Random 8,391 473,516
Popular 500 10,474
Total 12,097 844,702
Table 2: Overview of the collected data: number of seed videos and
number of their recommended videos acquired using each crawling
strategy.
mended videos associated with it, as returned by the YouTube
Data API, for up to three hops within YouTubes recommenda-
tion graph. We note that for each approach we use API keys
generated from different accounts. Table 2 summarizes the col-
lected dataset. In total, our dataset comprises 12K seed videos
and 844K videos that are recommended from the seed videos.
Note, that there is a small overlap between the videos col-
lected across the approaches, hence the number of total videos
is slightly smaller than the sum of all videos for the four ap-
proaches.
For each video in our dataset, we collect the following data
descriptors: 1) title and description; 2) thumbnail; 3) tags; and
4) video statistics like number of views, likes, dislikes, etc. We
chose to use these four data collection approaches for three rea-
sons: 1) to get more breadth into children’s content on YouTube,
instead of only collecting Elsagate-related videos; 2) to exam-
ine and analyze different types of videos while also assess-
ing the degree of the disturbing videos problem in these types
of videos; and 3) to train a classifier for detecting disturbing
videos able to generalize to the different types of videos avail-
able on YouTube.
Ethics. We confirm that for this study we only collect publicly
available data, while making no attempt to de-anonymize users.
In addition, all the manual annotators are informed adults.
2.2 Manual Annotation Process
To get labeled data, we manually review a 5K videos subset
of the collected dataset by inspecting their video content, title,
thumbnail, and tags (defined by the uploader of the video). Each
video is presented to three annotators that inspect its content
and metadata to assign one of the following labels:
Suitable: A video is suitable when its content is appropriate
for toddlers (aged 1-5 years) and it is relevant to their typical
interests. Some examples include normal cartoon videos, chil-
dren’s songs, children that are playing, and educational videos
(e.g., learning colors). In other words, any video that can be
classified as G by the MPAA and its target audience is toddlers.
Disturbing: A video is disturbing when it targets toddlers but it
contains sexual hints, sexually explicit or abusive/inappropriate
language, graphic nudity, child abuse (e.g., children hitting each
other), scream and horror sound effects, scary scenes or char-
acters (e.g., injections, attacks by insects, etc.). In general, any
video targeted at toddlers that should be classified as PG, PG-
13, NC-17, or R by MPAA is considered disturbing.
Restricted: We consider a video restricted when it does not
# Suitable # Disturbing # Restricted # Irrelevant
Elsagate-related 805 857 324 394
Other Child-related 650 47 21 243
Random 27 5 67 867
Popular 31 20 7 432
Total 1,513 929 419 1,936
Table 3: Summary of our final ground truth dataset.
target toddlers and it contains content that is inappropriate for
individuals under the age of 17. These videos are rated as R or
NC-17 according to MPAA’s ratings. Such videos usually con-
tain sexually explicit language, graphic nudity, pornography, vi-
olence (e.g., gaming videos featuring violence, or life-like vi-
olence, etc.), abusive/inappropriate language, online gambling,
drug use, alcohol, or upsetting situations and activities.
Irrelevant: We consider a video irrelevant when it contains
appropriate content that is not relevant to a toddler’s inter-
ests. That is, videos that are not disturbing or restricted but
are only suitable for school-aged children (aged 6-11 years),
adolescents (aged 12-17 years) and adults, like gaming videos
(e.g., Minecraft) or music videos (e.g., a video clip of John Leg-
end’s song) reside in this category. In general, G, PG and PG-13
videos that do not target toddlers are considered irrelevant.
We elect to use these labels for our annotation process in-
stead of adopting the five MPAA ratings for two reasons. First,
our scope is videos that would normally be rated as PG, PG-
13, R, and NC-17 but target very young audiences. We consider
such targeting a malevolent activity that needs to be treated sep-
arately. At the same time, we have observed that a significant
portion of videos that would normally be rated as R or NC-17
are already classified by YouTube as “age-restricted” and tar-
get either adolescents or adults. Second, YouTube does not use
MPAA ratings to flag videos, thus, a ground truth dataset with
such labels is not available.
Sampling Process. Our aim is to create a ground truth dataset
that enables us to: 1) understand the main characteristics of dis-
turbing toddler-oriented videos compared to suitable children
videos on YouTube; and 2) train a deep learning model that
will detect disturbing videos with an acceptable performance
while being able to generalize to the various types of videos
available on the platform. To this end, we use the following
videos for the annotation process. 1) We randomly select 1,000
of the 2,342 seed child-related videos aiming to get suitable
videos. 2) Since the Elsagate-related collected videos are likely
to include disturbing videos, we select all the seed Elsagate-
related videos (1,074), as well as a small, randomly selected
set (1,171) of their recommended videos. 3) To get a sample
of restricted videos, we randomly select 500 of the 2,597 age-
restricted videos in our dataset. 4) To ensure that we include
irrelevant videos, we select all the seed popular videos (500)
as well as a small set (1,000) of the 8,391 randomly collected
videos.
Manual Annotation. The annotation process is carried out by
two of the authors of this study and 76 undergraduate students
(aged 20-24 years), both male and female. Each video is anno-
tated by the two authors and one of the undergraduate students.
3
Category Suitable (%) Disturbing (%) Restricted (%) Irrelevant (%)
Elsagate-related Entertainment 353 (43.9%) 208 (24.3%) 99 (30.6%) 98 (24.9%)
Film & Animation 130 (16.2%) 190 (22.2%) 39 (12.0%) 33 (8.4%)
Education 128 (15.9%) 21 (2.5%) 17 (5.3%) 16 (4.1%)
People & Blogs 109 (13.5%) 239 (27.9%) 71 (21.9%) 73 (18.5%)
Music 21 (2.6%) 15 (1.8%) 8 (2.5%) 45 (11.4%)
Other Entertainment 131 (20.3%) 7 (14.9%) 9 (42.9%) 51 (21.0%)
Child-related Film & Animation 317 (48.8%) 27 (57.5%) 3 (14.3%) 26 (10.7%)
Education 27 (4.2%) 1 (2.1%) 2 (9.5%) 34 (14.0%)
People & Blogs 130 (20.0%) 4 (8.5%) 2 (9.5%) 35 (14.4%)
Music 5 (0.8%) 2 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 26 (10.7%)
Random Entertainment 4 (14.8%) 1 (20.0%) 3 (4.5%) 68 (7.8%)
Film & Animation 1 (3.7%) 1 (20.0%) 1 (1.5%) 18 (2.1%)
Education 1 (3.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 31 (3.6%)
People & Blogs 13 (48.2%) 3 (60.0%) 21 (31.3%) 354 (40.8%)
Music 1 (3.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 79 (9.1%)
Popular Entertainment 12 (38.7%) 9 (45.0%) 2 (28.6%) 168 (38.9%)
Film & Animation 9 (29.0%) 7 (35.0%) 0 (0.0%) 13 (3.0%)
Education 2 (6.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (2.6%)
People & Blogs 2 (6.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 32 (7.4%)
Music 0 (0.0%) 1 (5.0%) 0 (0.0%) 63 (14.6%)
Table 4: Number of videos in each category per class for each subset
of videos in our ground truth dataset.
The students come from different backgrounds and receive no
specific training with regard to our study. To ease the annotation
process, we develop a platform10 that includes a clear descrip-
tion of the annotation task, our labels, as well as all the video
information that an annotator needs in order to inspect and cor-
rectly annotate a video.
After obtaining all the annotations, we compute the Fleiss
agreement score (κ) [17] across all annotators: we find κ =
0.60, which is considered “moderate” agreement. We also as-
sess the level of agreement between the two authors, as we con-
sider them experienced annotators, finding κ = 0.69, which is
considered “substantial” agreement. Finally, for each video we
assign one of the labels according to the majority agreement
of all the annotators, except a small percentage (4%) where all
annotators disagreed, which we also exclude from our ground
truth dataset. Table 3 summarizes our ground truth dataset,
which includes 1,513 suitable, 929 disturbing, 419 restricted,
and 1,936 irrelevant videos 11
2.3 Ground Truth Dataset Analysis
In this section, we analyze each set of videos in our ground
truth dataset separately to investigate if there are meaningful
differences in each set in regards to the problem of disturbing
videos on YouTube.
Category. First, we look at the categories of the videos in our
ground truth dataset. Table 4 reports the top five categories,
for each subset of videos. Most of the disturbing and restricted
videos in the Elsagate-related videos are in Entertainment (24%
and 31%), People & Blogs (28% and 22%), and Film & Ani-
mation (22% and 12%). These results are similar with previous
work [11]. A similar trend is also observed in all the other sets
of videos. In addition, in the Elsagate-related videos we find
a non-negligible percentage of disturbing videos in seemingly
innocent categories like Education (2.5%) and Music (1.8%).
This is alarming since it indicates that disturbing videos “infil-
trate” categories of videos that are likely to be selected by the
toddler’s parents. Unsurprisingly, after manually inspecting all
the disturbing videos in the Education and Music categories,
10http://www.disturbedyoutubeforkids.xyz:3333/
11Upon acceptance of this paper, the manually annotated ground truth dataset
will be publicly released.
we find that the majority of them are nursery rhymes, “wrong
heads”, and “peppa pig” videos with disturbing content.
Title. The title of a video is an important factor that affects
whether a particular video will be recommended when view-
ing other toddler-oriented videos. Consequently, we study the
titles in our ground truth dataset to understand the tactics and
terms that are usually used by uploaders of disturbing or re-
stricted videos on YouTube. First, we pre-process the title by
tokenizing the text into words and then we perform stemming
using the Porter Stemmer algorithm. Figure 2 shows the top
15 stems found in titles along with their proportion for each
class of videos for all the different sets of videos in our ground
truth dataset. Unsurprisingly, the top 15 stems of the Elsagate-
related videos refer to popular cartoons like Peppa Pig, Mickey
and Minnie mouse, Elsa, and Spiderman (see Figure 2a). When
looking at the results, we observe that a substantial percentage
of the videos that include these terms in their title are actually
disturbing. For example, from the videos that contain the terms
“spiderman” and “mous”, 82.6% and 80.4%, respectively, are
disturbing. Similar trends are observed with other terms like
“peppa” (78.6%), “superhero”(76.7%), “pig” (76.4%), “frozen”
(63.5%), and “elsa” (62.5%). Also, we observe a small percent-
age of the other child-related videos that contain the terms “fe-
lix” (7.1%), “cat” (4.2%), and “cartoon” (3.8%) are also dis-
turbing (see Figure 2b).
These results reveal that disturbing videos on YouTube refer
to seemingly “innocent” cartoons in their title, but in reality the
content of the video is likely to be either restricted or disturb-
ing. Note that we find these terms in suitable videos too. This
demonstrates that it is quite hard to distinguish suitable from
disturbing videos by only inspecting their titles.
Tags. Tags are words that uploaders define when posting a
video on YouTube. They are an important feature, since they
determine for which search results the video will appear. To
study the effect of tags in this problem, we plot in Figure 3
the top 15 stems from tags found in each subset of videos
in our ground truth dataset. We make several observations:
first, in the Elsagate-related and other child-related videos there
is a substantial overlap between the stems found in the tags
and title (cf. Figure 2 and Figure 3). Second, in the Elsagate-
related videos we find that suitable and disturbing classes have
a considerable percentage for each tag, hence highlighting that
Elsagate-related disturbing videos use the same tags as suitable
videos. Inspecting these results, we find that the tags “funni”
(47.8%), “elsa” (58.7%), “frozen” (57.8%), “cartoon” (48.8%),
and “anim” (44.5%) appear mostly in disturbing videos. Also,
“spiderman” (74.4%) and “mous” (73.0%) appear to have a
higher portion of disturbing videos than the other tags (see
Figure 3a). Third, we observe that the tags “mous” (73.0%),
“anim” (44.5%), “cartoon” (48.8%), “video” (31.5%), “disney”
(36.5%), and “kid” (34.2%) that appear in a considerable num-
ber of disturbing Elsagate-related videos also appear in a high
portion of suitable other child-related videos (cf. Figure 3a and
Figure 3b). The main take-away from this analysis is that it is
hard to detect disturbing content just by looking at the tags,
and that popular tags are shared among disturbing and suitable
videos.
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Figure 2: Per class proportion of videos for top 15 stems found in titles of (a) Elsagate-related; (b) other child-related; (c) random; and (d)
popular videos.
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Figure 3: Per class proportion of videos for the top 15 stems found in video tags of (a) Elsagate-related; (b) other child-related; (c) random; and
(d) popular videos.
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Figure 4: Per class proportion of videos for the top 15 labels found in thumbnails of (a) Elsagate-related; (b) other child-related; (c) random; and
(d) popular videos.
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Figure 5: Per class proportion of videos that their thumbnail contains spoofed, adult, medical, violent, and/or racy content for (a) Elsagate-related;
(b) other child-related; (c) random; and (d) popular videos.
Thumbnails. To study the thumbnails of the videos in our
ground truth dataset, we make use of the Google Cloud Vi-
sion API12, which is a RESTful API that derives useful insights
12https://cloud.google.com/vision/
from images using pre-trained machine learning models. Using
this API we are able to: 1) extract descriptive labels for all the
thumbnails in our ground truth; and 2) check whether a modifi-
cation was made to a thumbnail, and whether a thumbnail con-
5
0100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109
# of views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(a)
0100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109
# of views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(b)
0 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
# of views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(c)
0 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
# of views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(d)
Figure 6: CDF of the number of views per class for (a) Elsagate-related (b) other child-related, (c) random, and (d) popular videos.
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Figure 7: CDF of the fraction of likes per class for (a) Elsagate-related (b) other child-related, (c) random, and (d) popular videos.
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50
# of comments/views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(a)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
# of comments/views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(b)
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
# of comments/views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(c)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
# of comments/views
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Suitable
Disturbing
Restricted
Irrelevant
(d)
Figure 8: CDF of the number of comments/views per class for (a) Elsagate-related (b) other child-related, (c) random, and (d) popular videos.
tains adult, medical-related, violent, and/or racy content. Fig-
ure 4 depicts the top 15 labels derived from the thumbnails
of videos in our ground truth. In the Elsagate-related case, we
observe that the thumbnails of disturbing videos contain simi-
lar entities as the thumbnails of both the Elsagate-related and
other child-related suitable videos (cartoons, fictional charac-
ters, etc.).
Figure 5 shows the proportion of each class for videos
that contain spoofed, adult, medical-related, violent, and/or
racy content. As expected, most of the Elsagate-related videos
whose thumbnails contain adult (54.9%) and medical content
(53.5%) are restricted. However, this is not the case for videos
whose thumbnails contain spoofed (47.4%), violent (60.0%)
or racy (34.8%) content, where we observe a high number of
disturbing videos (cf. Figure 5a). Surprisingly, we notice that
100.0% of the other child-related videos whose thumbnail con-
tains violent content are suitable. Nonetheless, after manually
inspecting some of those thumbnails we notice that they depict
mild cartoon violence (i.e., tom hitting jerry), which we con-
sider as suitable. In general, we observe that Elsagate-related
videos whose thumbnail is modified with violent, racy, medical,
and/or adult content are more likely to be restricted or disturb-
ing, while this is not the case for the other child-related videos.
Statistics. Next, we examine various statistics pertaining to the
videos in our ground truth dataset. Figure 6 shows the CDF of
the number of views of all the videos in each distinct subset
of videos in our ground truth. We observe that Elsagate-related
suitable videos have substantially more views than disturbing
videos while this is not the case for all the other type of videos.
Figure 7 shows the CDF of the fraction of likes of all the videos
in each subset. Interestingly, we observe that in all cases dis-
turbing and restricted videos have a higher fraction of likes
than suitable videos, which particularly in the case of disturb-
ing videos indicates manipulation to boost their ranking. Last,
Figure 8 shows the CDF of the fraction of comments to views.
While for the Elsagate-related videos we see that suitable and
disturbing have a similar ratio of comments, this is not the case
in all the other types of videos where we observe a higher ratio
of comments for disturbing and restricted videos compared to
suitable videos.
A general take away from this ground truth analysis is that
none of the video’s metadata can clearly indicate that a video
is disturbing or not, thus, in most cases one (e.g., a guardian)
has to carefully inspect all the available video metadata, and
potentially the actual video, to accurately determine if it is safe
for a toddler to watch.
Assessing YouTube’s Counter-measures. To assess how fast
YouTube detects and removes inappropriate videos, we lever-
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age the YouTube Data API to count the number of off-line
videos (either removed by YouTube due to a Terms of Service
violation or deleted by the uploader) in our manually reviewed
ground truth dataset. We note that we do not consider the videos
that were already marked as age-restricted, since YouTube took
the appropriate measures.
As of May 10, 2019 only 9.65% of the suitable, 20.5% of the
disturbing, 2.5% of the restricted, and 2.4% of the irrelevant
videos were removed, while from those that were still avail-
able, 0.0%, 6.9%, 1.3%, and 0.1%, respectively, were marked
as age-restricted. Alarmingly, the amount of the deleted dis-
turbing and restricted videos, is considerably low. The same
observation stands for the amount of disturbing and restricted
videos marked as age-restricted. A potential issue here is that
the videos on our dataset were recently uploaded and YouTube
simply did not have time to detect them. To test this hypoth-
esis, we calculate the mean number of days from publication
up to May, 2019: we find this hypothesis does not hold. The
mean number of days since being uploaded for the suitable,
disturbing, restricted, and irrelevant videos is 866, 942, 1091,
and 991, respectively, with a mean of 947 days across the en-
tire manually reviewed ground truth dataset. This indicate that
YouTube’s deployed counter-measures eliminated some of the
disturbing videos, but they are unable to effectively tackle the
problem in a timely manner.
3 Detection of Disturbing Videos
In this section we provide the details of our deep learning model
for the detection of disturbing videos on YouTube.
3.1 Dataset and Feature Description
To train and test our proposed deep learning model we use
our ground truth dataset of 4,797 videos, summarized in Ta-
ble 3. For each video in our ground truth our model processes
the following:
Title. Our model considers the text of the title by training an
embedding layer, which encodes each word in the text in an
N-dimensional vector space. The maximum number of words
found in a title of videos in our ground truth is 21, while the
size of the vocabulary is 12,023.
Tags. Similarly to the title, we encode the video tags into an
N-dimensional vector space by training a separate embedding
layer. The maximum number of tags found in a video is 78,
while the size of the word vocabulary is 40,096.
Thumbnail. We scale down the thumbnail images to 299x299
while preserving all three color channels.
Statistics. We consider all available statistical metadata for
videos (number of views, likes, dislikes, and comments).
Style Features. We consider some style features from the actual
video (e.g., duration), the title (e.g., number of bad words), the
video description (e.g., description length), and the tags (e.g.,
number of tags). For this we use features proposed in [22] that
help the model to better differentiate between the videos of each
class. Table 5 summarizes the style features that we use.
Type Style Features Description
Video-related video category, video duration
Statistics-related ratio of # of likes to dislikes
Title- & description-related length of title, length of description,
ratio of description to title,
jaccard similarity between title and description,
# of ’!’ and ’?’ in title and description,
# of emoticons in title and description,
# of bad words in title and description,
# of child-related words in title and description
Tags-related # of tags, # of bad words in tags,
# of child-related words in tags,
jaccard similarity between tags and video title
Table 5: List of the style features extracted from the available metadata
of a video.
3.2 Model Architecture
Figure 9 depicts the architecture of our classifier, which com-
bines the above mentioned features. Initially, the classifier con-
sists of four different branches, where each branch processes
a distinct feature type: title, tags, thumbnail, and statistics and
style features. Then the outputs of all the branches are concate-
nated to form a two-layer, fully connected neural network that
merges their output and drives the final classification.
The title feature is fed to a trainable embedding layer that
outputs a 32-dimensional vector for each word in the title text.
Then, the output of the embedding layer is fed to a Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) [20] Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
that captures the relationships between the words in the title.
For the tags, we use an architecturally identical branch trained
separately from the title branch.
For thumbnails, due to the limited number of training ex-
amples in our dataset, we use transfer learning [25] and
the pre-trained Inception-v3 Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) [34], which is built from the large-scale ImageNet
dataset.13 We use the pre-trained CNN to extract a meaning-
ful feature representation (2,048-dimensional vector) of each
thumbnail. Last, the statistics together with the style features
are fed to a fully-connected dense neural network comprising
25 units.
The second part of our classifier is essentially a two-
layer, fully-connected dense neural network. At the first layer,
(dubbed Fusing Network), we merge together the outputs of the
four branches, creating a 2,137-dimensional vector. This vector
is subsequently processed by the 512 units of the Fusing Net-
work. Next, to avoid possible over-fitting issues we regularize
via the prominent Dropout technique [29]. We apply a Dropout
level of d = 0.5, which means that during each iterations of
training, half of the units in this layer do not update their pa-
rameters. Finally, the output of the Fusing Network is fed to the
last dense-layer neural network of four units with softmax ac-
tivation, which are essentially the probabilities that a particular
video is suitable, disturbing, restricted, or irrelevant.
3.3 Experimental Evaluation
We implement our model using Keras [13] with TensorFlow
as the backend [1]. To train our model we use k-fold cross-
13http://image-net.org/
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Figure 9: Architecture of our deep learning model for detecting disturbing videos. The model processes almost all the video features: (a) tags;
(b) title; (c) statistics and style; and (d) thumbnail.
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
Naive Bayes 0.339 (+/- 0.03) 0.340 (+/- 0.02) 0.324 (+/- 0.02) 0.301 (+/- 0.03)
K-Nearest 0.348 (+/- 0.01) 0.301 (+/- 0.02) 0.299 (+/- 0.02) 0.297 (+/- 0.02)
Decision Tree 0.375 (+/- 0.02) 0.322 (+/- 0.02) 0.319 (+/- 0.02) 0.317 (+/- 0.02)
SVM 0.412 (+/- 0.00) 0.392 (+/- 0.03) 0.260 (+/- 0.00) 0.172 (+/- 0.01)
Random Forest 0.570 (+/- 0.01) 0.466 (+/- 0.11) 0.417 (+/- 0.01) 0.394 (+/- 0.01)
DDNN 0.467 (+/- 0.03) 0.374 (+/- 0.02) 0.368 (+/- 0.02) 0.365 (+/- 0.02)
CNN-DDNN 0.540 (+/- 0.04) 0.481 (+/- 0.02) 0.479 (+/- 0.02) 0.472 (+/- 0.02)
Proposed Model 0.640 (+/- 0.01) 0.495 (+/- 0.02) 0.509 (+/- 0.01) 0.478 (+/- 0.02)
Table 6: Performance metrics for the evaluated baselines and for the
proposed deep learning model.
validation [6]. Specifically, we use five-fold stratified cross val-
idation and we train and test our model using all the afore-
mentioned features. To deal with the data imbalance prob-
lem we use the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling technique
(SMOTE) [12] to oversample the train set at each fold.
For the stochastic optimization of our model, we use the
Adam algorithm with an initial learning rate of 1e−5, and
 = 1e−8. To evaluate our model, we compare it in terms of
accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, and area under the ROC
curve (AUC) against the following five baselines: 1) a Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) with parameters γ = auto and
C = 10.0; 2) a K-Nearest Neighbors classifier with n = 8
neighbors and leaf size equal to 10; 3) a Bernoulli Naive Bayes
classifier with a = 1.0; 4) a Decision Tree classifier with an
entropy criterion; and 5) a Random Forest classifier with an
entropy criterion and number of trees equal to 100. To further
evaluate the performance of our model, we also compare it with
two deep neural networks: 1) a simple double dense layer net-
work (DDNN); and 2) a CNN combined with a double dense
layer network (CNN-DDNN). For hyper-parameter tuning of
all the baselines we use the grid search strategy, while for the
deep neural networks we use the same hyper-parameters as with
the proposed model. For a fair comparison, we note that all the
evaluated models use all the available input features.
Table 6 reports the performance of the proposed model as
well as the 7 baselines, while Figure 10 shows their ROC
curves. Although the proposed model outperforms all the base-
lines in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, and AUC,
it still has poor performance.
Ablation Study. In an attempt to understand which of the input
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Figure 10: ROC curves (and AUC) of all the baselines and of the pro-
posed model trained for multi-class classification.
Thumbnail Title Tags Statistics & Style Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
X 0.636 (+/- 0.01) 0.475 (+/- 0.01) 0.496 (+/- 0.01) 0.451 (+/- 0.01)
X 0.459 (+/- 0.02) 0.352 (+/- 0.04) 0.328 (+/- 0.04) 0.301 (+/- 0.06)
X 0.395 (+/- 0.05) 0.291 (+/- 0.09) 0.304 (+/- 0.03) 0.265 (+/- 0.05)
X 0.433 (+/- 0.04) 0.348 (+/- 0.02) 0.346 (+/- 0.01) 0.288 (+/- 0.04)
X X 0.634 (+/- 0.01) 0.453 (+/- 0.02) 0.497 (+/- 0.01) 0.453 (+/- 0.01)
X X 0.629 (+/- 0.01) 0.468 (+/- 0.01) 0.493 (+/- 0.01) 0.449 (+/- 0.01)
X X 0.631 (+/- 0.02) 0.477 (+/- 0.04) 0.503 (+/- 0.02) 0.472 (+/- 0.02)
X X 0.485 (+/- 0.06) 0.396 (+/- 0.06) 0.376 (+/- 0.05) 0.363 (+/- 0.05)
X X 0.439 (+/- 0.05) 0.389 (+/- 0.04) 0.368 (+/- 0.03) 0.335 (+/- 0.05)
X X 0.407 (+/- 0.01) 0.356 (+/- 0.03) 0.338 (+/- 0.02) 0.275 (+/- 0.02)
X X X 0.458 (+/- 0.03) 0.385 (+/- 0.01) 0.480 (+/- 0.04) 0.355 (+/- 0.03)
X X X 0.640 (+/- 0.02) 0.479 (+/- 0.05) 0.508 (+/- 0.02) 0.477 (+/- 0.03)
X X X 0.630 (+/- 0.02) 0.462 (+/- 0.04) 0.501 (+/- 0.02) 0.461 (+/- 0.03)
X X X 0.636 (+/- 0.01) 0.480 (+/- 0.04) 0.509 (+/- 0.01) 0.465 (+/- 0.01)
X X X X 0.640 (+/- 0.01) 0.495 (+/- 0.02) 0.509 (+/- 0.01) 0.478 (+/- 0.02)
Table 7: Performance of the proposed model trained with all the pos-
sible combinations of the four input feature types.
feature types contribute the most to the classification of disturb-
ing videos we perform an ablation study. That is, we systemat-
ically remove each of the four input feature types (as well as
their associated branch in the proposed model’s architecture),
while also training models with all the possible combinations
of the four input feature types. Again, to train and test these
models we use five-fold cross validation and the oversampling
technique to deal with data imbalance. Table 7 shows the per-
formance metrics of all the models for each possible combina-
tion of inputs. We observe that the thumbnail, is more important
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Class Appropriate (%) Inappropriate (%)
# of videos 3,449 (71.9%) 1,348 (28.1%)
Table 8: Summary of our ground truth dataset after collapsing our
labels into two categories.
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
K-Nearest 0.610 (+/- 0.02) 0.343 (+/- 0.03) 0.424 (+/- 0.03) 0.380 (+/- 0.03)
Decision Tree 0.678 (+/- 0.01) 0.442 (+/- 0.02) 0.562 (+/- 0.03) 0.495 (+/- 0.02)
SVM 0.718 (+/- 0.00) 0.471 (+/- 0.09) 0.029 (+/- 0.01) 0.054 (+/- 0.02)
Naive Bayes 0.728 (+/- 0.02) 0.522 (+/- 0.04) 0.363 (+/- 0.05) 0.428 (+/- 0.05)
Random Forest 0.804 (+/- 0.02) 0.740 (+/- 0.03) 0.464 (+/- 0.05) 0.569 (+/- 0.04)
DDNN 0.734 (+/- 0.01) 0.662 (+/- 0.02) 0.629 (+/- 0.02) 0.637 (+/- 0.02)
CNN-DDNN 0.720 (+/- 0.03) 0.688 (+/- 0.02) 0.724 (+/- 0.03) 0.690 (+/- 0.03)
Proposed Model 0.843 (+/- 0.02) 0.821 (+/- 0.01) 0.890 (+/- 0.01) 0.829 (+/- 0.02)
Table 9: Performance of the evaluated baselines trained for binary
classification and of our proposed binary classifier.
than the other input feature types for good classification perfor-
mance.
Binary Classification. To perform a more representative anal-
ysis of the inappropriate videos on YouTube, we need a more
accurate classifier. Thus, for the sake of our analysis in the next
steps, we collapse our four labels into two general categories,
by combining the suitable with the irrelevant videos into one
“appropriate” category and the disturbing with the restricted
videos into a second “inappropriate” category. Table 8 summa-
rizes our ground truth dataset after collapsing our labels.
We call the first category “appropriate” despite including PG
and PG-13 videos because those videos are not aimed at tod-
dlers (irrelevant). On the other hand, videos rated as PG or PG-
13 that target toddlers (aged 1 to 5) are disturbing and fall un-
der the inappropriate category. When such videos appear on the
video recommendation list of toddlers, it is a strong indication
that they are disturbing and our binary classifier is very likely
to detect them as inappropriate.
We train and evaluate the proposed model for binary classifi-
cation on our reshaped ground truth dataset following the same
approach as the one presented above. Table 9 reports the perfor-
mance of our model as well as the baselines, while Figure 11
shows their ROC curves. We observe that our deep learning
model outperforms all baseline models across all performance
metrics. Specifically, our model substantially outperforms the
CNN-DDNN model, which has the best overall performance
from all the evaluated baselines, on accuracy, precision, recall,
F1 score and AUC by 12.3%, 13.3%, 16.6%, 13.9%, 11.0%
respectively.
4 Analysis
In this section, we study the interplay of appropriate and inap-
propriate videos on YouTube using our binary classifier. First,
we assess the prevalence of inappropriate videos in each sub-
set of videos in our dataset and investigate how likely it is
for YouTube to recommend an inappropriate video. Second,
we perform live random walks on YouTube’s recommendation
graph to simulate the behavior of a toddler that selects videos
based on the recommendations.
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Figure 11: ROC Curves of all the baselines and of the proposed model
trained for binary classification.
Videos subset Appropriate (%) Inappropriate (%)
Elsagate-related 230,890 (98.95%) 2,447 (1.05%)
Other Child-related 154,262 (99.55%) 695 (0.45%)
Random 478,420 (99.28%) 3,487 (0.72%)
Popular 10,947 (99.75%) 27 (0.25%)
Table 10: Number of appropriate and inappropriate videos found in
each subset of videos in our dataset.
4.1 Recommendation Graph Analysis
First, we investigate the prevalence of inappropriate videos in
each subset of videos in our dataset by running our binary clas-
sifier on the whole dataset, which allows us to find which videos
are inappropriate or appropriate. Table 10 shows the number of
appropriate and inappropriate videos found in each subset. For
the Elsagate-related videos, we find 231K (98.9%) appropriate
videos and 2.5K (1.1%) inappropriate videos, while the propor-
tion of inappropriate videos is a bit lower in the set of other
child-related videos (0.4% inappropriate and 99.5% appropri-
ate). These findings highlight the gravity of the problem: a par-
ent searching on YouTube with simple toddler-oriented key-
words and casually selecting from the recommended videos,
is likely to expose their child to inappropriate videos.
But what is the interplay between the inappropriate and ap-
propriate videos in each subset? To shed light to this question,
we create a directed graph for each subset of videos, where
nodes are videos, and edges are recommended videos (up to 10
videos due to our data collection methodology). For instance, if
video2 is recommended via video1 then we add an edge from
video1 to video2. Then, for each video in each graph, we cal-
culate the out-degree in terms of appropriate and inappropriate
labeled nodes. From here, we can count the number of transi-
tions the graph makes between differently labeled nodes. Ta-
ble 11 summarizes the percentages of transitions between the
two classes of videos in each subset. Unsurprisingly, we find
that most of the transitions in each subset (98%-99%), are be-
tween appropriate videos, which is mainly because of the large
number of appropriate videos in each set. We also find that
when a toddler watches an Elsagate-related benign video, if she
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Source Destination Elsagate-related (%) Other Child-related (%) Random (%) Popular (%)
Appropriate Appropriate 917,319 (97.80%) 648,406 (99.49%) 1,319,518 (98.82%) 34,764 (99.12%)
Appropriate Inappropriate 5,951 (0.64%) 1,681 (0.26%) 7,014 (0.53%) 64 (0.18%)
Inappropriate Appropriate 14,202 (1.51%) 1,542 (0.24%) 7,946 (0.59%) 246 (0.70%)
Inappropriate Inappropriate 478 (0.05%) 72 (0.01%) 831 (0.06%) 0 (0.00%)
Table 11: Number of transitions between appropriate and inappropriate videos for each subset of videos in our dataset.
randomly follows one of the top ten recommended videos, there
is a 0.6% probability that she will end up at a disturbing or re-
stricted video. Taken altogether, these findings show that the
problem of toddler-oriented inappropriate videos on YouTube is
notable, especially when considering YouTube’s massive scale
and the large number of views of toddler-oriented videos.That
is, there is a non-negligible chance that a toddler will be recom-
mended an inappropriate video when watching an appropriate
video.
4.2 How likely is it for a toddler to come across
inappropriate videos?
In the previous section, we showed that the problem of
toddler-oriented videos is prevalent enough to be cause for con-
cern. However, it is unclear whether the previous results gener-
alize to YouTube at large since our dataset is based on a snow-
ball sampling up to three hops from a set of seed videos. In re-
ality though, YouTube comprises billions of videos, which are
recommended over many hops within YouTube’s recommenda-
tion graph. Therefore, to assess how prominent the problem is
on a larger scale, we perform live random walks on YouTube’s
recommendation graph. This allow us to simulate the behavior
of a “random toddler” who searches the platform for a video
and then he watches several videos according to the recommen-
dations. To do this, we use the lists of Elsagate-related and other
child-related seed keywords used for constructing our dataset,
as well as a list of sanitized Elsagate-related seed keywords
which we construct by stripping all the inappropriate words
from all the Elsagate-related keywords using a dictionary of in-
appropriate words 14. We do this to assess the degree of the
problem around Elsagate-related videos while ensuring that we
are not biasing the search results with any sensitive words.
For each seed keyword, we initially perform a search query
on YouTube and randomly select one video from the top ten
results. Then, we obtain the recommendations of the video and
select one randomly. We iterate with the same process until we
reach ten hops, which constitutes the end of a single random
walk. We repeat this operation for 100 random walks for each
seed keyword, while at the same time classifying each video we
visit, using our binary classifier.
First, we group the random walks based on the keywords
used to seed them. Fig. 12a shows the cumulative percentage
of inappropriate videos encountered at each hop of the ran-
dom walks for Elsagate-related, sanitized Elsagate-related, and
other child-related search keywords. We observe that, when us-
ing sanitized Elsagate-related keywords, we find at least one
14https://tinyurl.com/yxb4kmxg
inappropriate video in 3.5% of the walks, while for the other
child-related keywords we find at least one inappropriate video
in 1.3% of the walks. We also observe that most of the inap-
propriate videos are found early in our random walks (i.e., at
the first hop) and this number decreases as the number of hops
increases. These findings highlight that the problem of inap-
propriate videos on YouTube emerges quite early when users’
are browsing the platform starting from benign toddler-oriented
search terms.
Next, to assess whether our results change according to the
content of the videos we use the k-means clustering algo-
rithm [19] to create clusters from all the seed keywords. Then,
we manually inspect the clusters and associate a label to each
cluster. For example, all seed keywords related to “Peppa pig”
are grouped into one cluster and are assigned the label “Peppa
pig”. Table 12 summarizes the clusters and the number of seed
keywords in each cluster. Then, based on the clusters we group
the random walks. Fig. 12b shows the cumulative percentage of
inappropriate videos encountered at each hop for each cluster.
We observe interesting differences across the clusters: specifi-
cally, we observe the higher percentages in the “Elsa and Spi-
derman” (3.2%), and “Peppa pig” (2.9%) cluster, whereas for
the clusters “finger family” (1.0%) and “other cartoon” (0.5%)
we observe a lower percentage of walks with inappropriate
videos. Also, we find that most of the inappropriate videos are
found in the beginning of the random walks in particular for the
clusters “Peppa pig” (2.3%) and “Elsa and Spiderman” (1.3%)
(see first hop in Fig. 12b).
Note that, by merging the two classes in the binary clas-
sifier while seeking out disturbing videos with short random
walks from suitable videos, we correct for the misclassification
of disturbing videos as restricted. That is, an NC-17 video in
the proximity of benign toddler-oriented videos could be er-
roneously classified as restricted by the multi-class classifier
(because of similarities with the NC-17 videos that do not tar-
get toddlers). However, due to this proximity, this is probably
an NC-17 video that targets toddlers and should have there-
fore been classified as disturbing. Thus, the vast majority of
inappropriate videos detected during the random walks are ex-
pected to be disturbing. In fact, 84.6% of the detected inap-
propriate videos are disturbing (obtained by inspecting all the
338 detected inappropriate videos). On the other hand, videos
that would be classified as irrelevant by the multi-class classi-
fier, fall under the appropriate category of the binary classifier.
However, the training set for the appropriate category includes
irrelevant videos, which include PG and PG-13 videos that do
not target toddlers. Therefore, the binary classifier may classify
such a video that is in the proximity of suitable videos as ap-
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Cluster name # of seed keywords
Elsa and Spiderman 24
Peppa Pig 9
Minnie and Mickey mouse 5
Finger Family 6
Other Cartoon 11
Table 12: Summary of our clusters and the number of seed keywords
in each cluster.
propriate. However, a PG and PG-13 video in the proximity of
suitable videos is likely to actually be disturbing, thus inappro-
priate. This negatively affects the accuracy of the binary clas-
sifier. Yet, only 1.6% of the videos encountered during the ran-
dom walks and classified as appropriate were in fact disturbing
(obtained by sampling 300 of the 176,619 detected appropriate
videos).
5 Related Work
Prior work studied YouTube videos with inappropriate content
for children, as well as spam, hate or malicious activity.
Inappropriate Content for Children. Several studies focused
on understanding videos that target young children, and how
they interact with them and the platform. [10] suggests the ad-
dition of extra parental controls on YouTube to prevent chil-
dren from accessing inappropriate content. [5] study the audi-
ence profiles and comments posted on YouTube videos in pop-
ular children-oriented channels, and conclude that children un-
der the age of 13 use YouTube and are exposed to advertising,
inappropriate content, and privacy issues. [16] propose a bi-
nary classifier, based on video metadata, for identifying suitable
YouTube videos for children. [22] focus on the characterization
and detection of unsafe content for children and its promoters
on YouTube. They propose a machine learning classifier that
considers a set of video-, user-, and comment-level features for
the detection of users that promote unsafe content. [21] stud-
ied the Elsagate phenomenon and they propose a deep learn-
ing model for detecting Elsagate content on YouTube trained
on a unannotated dataset of 3K child-related videos. [28] fo-
cus on the detection of child unsafe content. They propose an
LSTM-based deep neural network for the detection of unsafe
content, trained on an annotated dataset collected using four
anime series. Deep neural network based architectures have
also been proposed for large-scale video recommendation on
YouTube [15].
Spam, Hate and other Malicious Activity. A large body of
previous work focused on the detection of malicious activity
on YouTube. [33] use social network analysis techniques to
discover hate and extremist YouTube videos, as well as hid-
den communities in the ecosystem. [2] develop a binary classi-
fier trained with user and video features for detecting YouTube
videos that promote hate and extremism. [18] use video, au-
dio, and textual features for training a k-nearest neighbors clas-
sifier for detecting YouTube videos containing violence. [26]
perform an in-depth analysis on video comments posted by alt-
right channels on YouTube. They conclude that the comments
of a video are a better indicator for detecting alt-right videos
when compared to the video’s title. [3] use video features for
detecting videos violating privacy or promoting harassment.
With regard to spam detection, [14] explore video attributes
that may enable the detection of spam videos on YouTube. A
similar study [32] focuses on both user features and comment
activity logs to propose formulas/rules that can accurately de-
tect spamming YouTube users. Using similar features, [9] char-
acterize and identify fraudulently promoted YouTube videos.
[11] use only video features, and propose a one-class classifier
approach for detecting spam videos.
[24] use dynamic network analysis methods to identify the
nature of different spam campaign strategies. [7] propose two
supervised classification algorithms to detect spammers, pro-
moters, and legitimate YouTube users. Also, in an effort to im-
prove the performance of spam filtering on the platform, the
authors of [4] test numerous approaches and propose a tool,
based on Naive Bayes, that filters spam comments on YouTube.
Finally, [37] propose a deep learning classifier for identify-
ing videos that use manipulative techniques in order to increase
their views (i.e., clickbait videos).
In contrast to all the above inappropriate content and mali-
cious activity studies, we are the first to focus on the charac-
terization and detection of disturbing videos, i.e., inappropriate
videos that explicitly target toddlers. We collect thousands of
YouTube videos and manually annotate them according to four
relevant categories. We develop a deep learning classifier that
can detect inappropriate videos with an accuracy of 84.3%. By
classifying and analyzing these videos, we shed light on the
prevalence of the problem on YouTube, and how likely it is for
an inappropriate video to be served to a toddler who casually
browses the platform.
6 Conclusions
An increasing number of young children are shifting from
broadcast to streaming video consumption, with YouTube pro-
viding an endless array of content tailored toward young view-
ers. While much of this content is age-appropriate, there is also
an alarming amount of inappropriate material available.
In this paper, we present the first characterization of in-
appropriate or disturbing videos targeted at toddlers. From a
ground truth labeled dataset, we develop a deep learning classi-
fier that achieves an accuracy of 84.3%. We leverage this classi-
fier to perform a large-scale study of toddler-oriented content on
YouTube, finding 1.05% of the 233,337 Elsagate-related videos
in our dataset to be inappropriate. Even worse, we discover a
3.5% chance of a toddler who starts by watching appropriate
videos to be recommended inappropriate ones within ten rec-
ommendations.
Although scientific debate (and public opinion) on the risks
associated with “screen time” for young children is still on go-
ing, based on our findings, we believe a more pressing concern
to be the dangers of crowd-sourced, uncurated content com-
bined with engagement oriented, gameable recommendation
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Figure 12: Cumulative percentage of inappropriate videos encountered at each hop for: (a) Elsagate-related, sanitized Elsagate-related, and other
child-related seed keywords; and (b) clusters of seed keywords.
systems. Considering the advent of algorithmic content creation
(e.g., “deep fakes” [36]) and the monetization opportunities on
sites like YouTube, there is no reason to believe there will be
an organic end to this problem. Our classifier, and the insights
gained from our analysis, can be used as a starting point to gain
a deeper understanding and begin mitigating this issue.
Note that in this work, we collect and analyze a large num-
ber of Elsagate-related, other child-related, as well as random
and popular videos available on YouTube. Although not rep-
resentative of the entirety of YouTube, we believe that the set
of seed keywords (Elsagate-related and other child-related key-
words) cover a wide range of child-related content available on
the platform. With regard to our sampling process, we believe
that by including a wide range of child-related content as well
as other types of videos in our ground truth dataset, we aid the
proposed model to generalize to different types of videos that
are available on YouTube.
Limitations. Finally, we discuss some of the limitations of this
work. First, we collect and analyze videos only from YouTube
and not YouTube Kids. This is because YouTube does not pro-
vide an open API for collecting videos that appear on YouTube
Kids. However, according to YouTube, only videos marked as
age-restricted are excluded from YouTube Kids unless specific
settings are set by the parent15. Second, we acknowledge that
the performance of our classifier is highly affected by the small
training size: we were unable to provide a larger annotated
dataset mainly due to lack of resources for the annotation pro-
cess.
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